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by K.L. Kinsman
The best of several good things in Jack 
Blake’s article in ALR 74 (May 1980) was 
the use he made of history. In this he has the 
support, not only of Thucydides, but (more 
recently) of Professor P.M.S. Blackett, who, 
in 1948, said : "The first maxim of the 
scientific study of current events is tha t one 
should not attem pt to predict the future until 
one has attem pted to understand the past". 
( 1)
When Prime M inister Fraser said th a t the 
issue was not the Olympic Games but 
Afghanistan, President Carter corrected 
him. The issue is not A fghanistan, the
President said in his State of the Union 
Message, but the relationship between our 
two countries over the past thirty-five years
— th a t is, the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and the U.S.A. I think 
President Carter was quite right, except th a t 
he did not take it back far enough. I propose 
to take it back to the beginning — 1917.
But before starting  on this brief but epic 
journey, there are certain things I should like 
to make clear. F irst of all, the method. W hat I 
have attem pted to do is to present, as it were, 
an historical vector — a path  carved out 
through the highly complex web of historical 
ev en ts , in ten d ed  to help m ake th a t
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complexity more simple, more intelligible — 
a process, with which workers in the 
communications field are fam iliar, of 
d is e n ta n g l in g  a m essag e  from  its  
accom panying noise.
It is, of course, a personal vector; which is 
all you would get from anyone, no m atter 
how expert. And this leads me directly into 
my second point; which is, th a t the use of 
this method enables me to disavow any 
suggestion th a t my own personal vector is 
more true, more correct, more hum ane etc 
than  anybody else’s personal vector. More 
helpful, possibly — but th a t is for the reader 
to decide.
My third point relates to the message of 
this particular personal vector; namely, tha t 
the Soviet U nion’s external actions, almost 
from its inception, have been dictated by the 
requirements, as seen from within the Soviet 
Union, of national security. This is not the 
same thing as saying th a t those actions were 
justified  by security considerations. These 
are two separate propositions, requiring 
separate validation. I am concerned with the 
former, not the latter.
Fourthly, my concern has been with the 
o r ig in s  of th e  p re s e n t su p e rp o w er 
confrontation. Consequently, the vector 
stops in 1947, with the launching of the 
M arshall Plan. By th a t time, the main 
p a ra m e te rs  of th e  g am e h a d  been 
determined, and such events as the Berlin 
blockade or the CIA takeover of Iran  were as 
logically deducible from previous positions 
as an  end game of chess. I do believe, 
however, th a t the end of the war presented 
the world’s statesm en with an opportunity to 
solve the world’s problems which was as 
crim inally bungled as the opportunity 
presented by Versailles.
Finally, the vector is a vector. Almost by 
definition it is highly selective, its prime aim 
being to disentangle message from noise — 
or indeed from other messages. I have 
therefore restricted it to cover only the Soviet 
Union’s external actions, and not all of 
them. Accordingly no reference is made to 
internal events, such as the Moscow trials, 
which could be looked a t from a security 
point of view, but whose interpretation, not 
to say relevance, would unquestionably be 
challenged. They would, therefore, tend to 
obscure, ra ther than  clarify, the events 
under discussion.
The Analysis
Intervention
Actually we do not need to go all the way 
back to 1917. March 1918 will do, when the 
Bolsheviks, under duress, signed the Treaty 
of Brest Litovsk, by which Germany 
acquired vast areas of formerly Russian 
territory.
This treaty was nullified the following 
November. But the day before the Armistice, 
Winston Churchill gave a foretaste of w hat 
was to come, when he told a Cabinet meeting: 
"We should not attem pt to destroy the only 
police force in Germany We might have to 
build up the German army....for fear of the 
spread of Bolshevism".2
Churchill’s w arning was soon startingly 
justified. In Jan u a ry  1919, Karl Liebnecht 
and Rosa Luxemburg were arrested, and 
then murdered on their way to Moabit 
prison. Noske was governor-general of 
Berlin a t the time, and Pinson records him as 
say in g : "Som eone m ust become the  
b lo o d h o u n d .  I c a n n o t  e v a d e  th e  
responsibility". Pinson also says th a t 
"Ebert’s aim was not ‘to combat the 
revolution’, but to combat Bolshevism. But 
in pursuing this aim, Ebert and Noske came 
to rely heavily on the old-line soldiers".:t
While Ebert and the old-line soldiers 
co m b ated  B o lsh ev ism  in  G e rm an y , 
Churchill found plenty of willing volunteers 
to help combat it in its own heartland — 
Bolshevik Russia. There were a t least five, 
not counting the Czechs — Britain, France, 
J a p a n ,  A m e r ic a  a n d  P o la n d . T h e  
intervention in the west ended in October 
1920, with the Treaty of Riga, leaving 
Poland in occupation of large areas of the 
Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, 
well east of the ethnic boundary proposed by 
Lord Curzon the previous July. The 
Americans had left in April, but the 
Japanese stayed on until 1922.
Following the departure of British troops 
from Persia and Baku, the Soviets signed 
treaties with both Persia and the Turkey of 
Kemal Ataturk. Also with Germany — the 
Treaty of Rapallo, 1922. The Entente powers 
took the hint, and in 1925 broke up the 
rapprochement between these two pariah 
states by inducing Germany to sign the 
Treaty of Locarno. Recognition of the 
U.S.S.R. by European powers was gradually 
achieved during the twenties, but not by 
America until after the advent of Roosevelt
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— 1933, the year Poland signed a non­
aggression pact with Hitler.
The Thirties
By th is time a new th rea t to Soviet security 
had arisen in  Central Europe. In 1934 the 
U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations, 
which Nazi Germany and Jap an  had  just 
left. In May 1935 the U.S.S.R. signed pacts of 
m u tu a l a s s is ta n c e  w ith  F ran ce  an d  
Czechoslovakia. During 1936/8 the Soviet 
Union sent food and m ilitary aid to the 
Spanish Republic. And sometime in  this 
period, Anthony Eden coined the phrase: 
"Steady and collective resistance to all acts 
of unprovoked aggression".
However, in September 1938 the policy of 
collective security, with which the name of 
Litvinov is linked just as much as th a t of 
Eden, collapsed. Munich excluded the 
U.S.S.R. from Europe, and presented Hitler 
with the Czech fortifications as a free gift. In 
the middle of the crisis, the U.S.S.R. offered 
the Czechs m ilitary aid independent of 
F r a n c e .  T h e  o f f e r  w a s  r e f u s e d .
25 March — the occupation of Prague. 20 
May — Sir Alexander Cadogan records tha t 
the "P.M. says he will resign ra ther than  
sign alliance with Soviets". 25 July — 
Admiral Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly 
Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax led a m ilitary 
mission by a particularly slow boat to 
Moscow. A dam thwaite comments:
During the m onths o f haggling..the one 
question that really mattered, whether 
Poland and Romania would allow Soviet 
forces to cross their frontiers, was never 
raised. It was left to Voroshilov to ask this 
key question...on August N th . The failure of 
th e  W estern  n e g o tia to rs  to g iv e  a 
satisfactory answer led directly to the 
suspension o f the m ilitary conversations.4
24 August — the Nazi-Soviet pact was 
signed, with a secret protocol delimiting 
German and Soviet spheres of influence in 
Poland and the Baltic States. The German 
invasion of Poland was launched on 1 
September. The Red Army marched into the 
non-ethnic areas of Poland on 17 September. 
Arrangem ents were made for strategic bases 
in the Baltic States — followed, after the fall 
of France, by their incorporation in the 
U.S.S.R. F inland was less accommodating, 
and war broke out on 30 November. A 
fortnight later the U.S.S.R. became the first
state ever to be expelled from the League of 
Nations.
The French formed an arm y in the Middle 
East under General Weygand (the Saviour of 
Warsaw) and Britain seriously thought of 
sending to F inland planes th a t were going to 
be badly needed in south-east England, as 
soon as the phoney war was over.
The so-called "winter war" ended in March 
1940. The sole demands made on Finland 
were the original strategic dem ands the 
rejection of which had started it — demands 
th a t can fairly be said to have saved 
Leningrad. To the south-east of the Soviet 
Union, additional depth was obtained by the 
acquisition of Bessarabia and N. Bukovina.
The War
Came June 1941 and the collapse of 
S talin 's gamble. A.J.P. Taylor says th a t 
"Churchill had decided his policy in 
advance, and announced it over the radio the 
sam e evening — unreserved solidarity with 
Soviet Russia in the war against Hitler".5
Taylor has a note (same page) th a t "Some 
Conservatives took the line, which Senator 
Trum an did in the USA, th a t Germ ans and 
Russians should be left to cut their own 
throats. Moore-Brabazon, the M inister of 
Aircraft Production, indiscreetly said this in 
public, and protests from the workers in 
aircraft factories forced him to leave office". 
What Taylor does not say is th a t Churchill 
kicked Moore-Brabazon upstairs to the 
I louse of Lords.
One of S ta lin’s first dem ands was for the 
opening of the Second Front. This demand 
was reiterated in May 1942, when Molotov 
came to London to sign the twenty-year 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. Roosevelt 
was in favour of opening the Second front in 
1943, but Churchill was able to delay it until 
May 1944.
The following sequence of events in 1945 is 
interesting:
•  17 Jan u ary  - capture of Warsaw;
•  29 January  - Zhukov crosses the 1938 
German frontier;
• 4 February - Yalta Conference opens. 
S talin promises to enter the war against 
Jap an  three months after victory in Europe;
•  14 February — the bombing of Dresden
• 7 March - American forces cross Rhine;
• 12 April - death of Roosevelt, accession of 
Truman;
• 13 April - Red Army takes Vienna;
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• 23 April - Red Army reaches Berlin; - 
Czechoslovakian Skoda Works destroyed by 
U.S.A.F.;
•  30 April - H itler’s suicide;
• 2 May - Berlin surrenders to Red Army;
• 8 May - VE-Day (Anglo-Americans)
• 9 May - capture of Prague, VE-Day for the 
U.S.S.R.
Attention then switches to the Far East, and 
we have:
• 16 July - Atom test bomb exploded in New 
Mexico;
• 17 July - Potsdam Conference opens;
•  6 August - Hiroshima;
•  8 August - U.S.S.R. declares w ar on Japan , 
exactly on time;
• 9 August - Red Army invades M anchuria; - 
N agasaki;
•  14 August - Japan  agrees to surrender;
•  24 August — Japanese K wantung Army 
surrenders to Red Army;
•  2 September - M acarthur receives formal 
Japanese surrender aboard the U.S.S. 
Missouri;
- VJ-Day;
- the end of Lend Lease;
- the end of w hat Doris Lessing calls the 
second intensive phase of the twentieth 
century war.
Potsdam
There have, as President C arter points out, 
been 35 years of intermission. Taylor 
singles out the meeting a t Potsdam  as 
m arking "the beginning of the Cold War, 
and therefore of post-war history. Any 
chance of perm anent friendship was lost," 
he suggests, "when Truman forgot about the 
reconstruction loan to the USSR which 
Roosevelt had contemplated".K
The Potsdam meeting was, in fact, the first 
public exercise in Trum anship — something 
th a t was later enshrined in the Trum an 
D octrine. H enry  S tim pson , the  then  
Secretary of War, is quoted as saying: 
"Trum an stood up to the R ussians in the 
most em phatic and decisive m anner, telling 
them as to certain dem ands th a t they 
absolutely could not have, and th a t the US
was entirely against them ....He told the
Russians just where they got off, and 
generally bossed the whole meeting".7
The basis for T rum an’s aggressive 
attitude was the successful atom bomb test 
in New Mexico. Stimpson said th a t the 
President was "tremendously pepped by it",
and quotes the President as saying th a t "it 
gave him an entirely new feeling of 
confidence in talking to the Russians".8
The key public issue a t Potsdam was not, 
however, the atom bomb, to which I shall 
return, but reparations. The Yalta proposal 
for joint reparations from the whole of 
Germany was abandoned in favour of each 
country having a free hand in its own zone. 
"The Russians", Werth says, "fought this 
proposal for over a week." Werth comments: 
"Potsdam  m arked... .the beginning of the end 
of the ‘Big Three Peace’, of which the main 
pillar, as the Russians saw it, was jo in t 
control of Germany."9
The Atom Bomb
It is extraordinary — and extraordinarily 
illum inating — to read Churchill’s own 
account of how Stalin was told a t Potsdam 
about the atom bomb. The problem was how 
to tell S talin th a t the Anglo-Americans 
possessed a new and powerful bomb, "but 
not with any particulars". In the end, 
Trum an said "I think I had best just tell him, 
after one of our meetings, th a t we have an 
entirely novel form of bomb which we think 
will have a decisive effect on the Japanese".
"On July  24th", Churchill continues, 
"after our plenary meeting had ended, I saw 
the President go up to Stalin, and the two 
conversed alone....I can see it all as if it were 
yesterday. He seemed to be delighted....I am 
sure he had no idea of the significance of 
what he was being told. ‘How did it go?’ I 
asked Truman. ‘He never asked a question,’ 
he replied." 10
The point was that, with the development 
of the atom bomb, the participation of the 
U.S.S.R. in the Pacific war was no longer 
required — indeed, was no longer welcome. 
"The President and the State Department," 
says Taylor, "would have liked to get 
through without Soviet assistance a t all," as 
Churchill confirms in a minute to Eden."
Events themselves bear out this analysis. 
In June 1945 the Franck Committee, in a 
memorandum to the President, strongly 
deprecated the first use of the bomb against 
J a p a n e se  cities . On 8 A ugust, the 
Washington correspondent of the London 
Times reported t h a t :
The decision to use the new weapon was 
apparently taken quite recently, and 
am o u n ted  to a reversa l o f  prev ious  
policy...In the view o f some highly placed 
persons, those responsible came to the
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conclusion that they were justified in using  
any and all means to bring the war in the 
Pascific to a close w ithin the shortest 
possible time.
This report is confirmed by Stimpson in an  
article in  Harpers M agazine in February 
1947. "On 1 June, after discussion with the 
scientific panel, the Interim  Committee 
u n a n im o u s ly  ad o p te d  th e  fo llo w in g  
recommendations," of which the first was 
th a t "the bomb should be used against 
Jap an  as soon as possible."
Why the hurry? After all, it  took nearly 
three years to organise the Second Front. 
The answer has already been given: to 
forestall Soviet entry into the war, or a t least 
create the conditions for the occupation of 
J a p a n  a s  an  e x c lu s iv e  A m e r ic a n  
prerogative.
In a speech on 9 August Trum an said two 
■things:
We gladly welcome into the struggle 
against the last o f the A xis aggressors our 
gallant and victorious ally against the 
Nazis.
Though the US w ants no territory or pro f it 
or selfish advantage out of this war, we are 
going to m aintain the m ilitary bases 
necessary for the protection o f our interests 
and o f world peace. Bases which our military 
experts deem to be essential for our 
protection, and which are not now in our 
possession, we will acquire.
After the War was over
The history of the immediate post-war 
years is dominated by three m ain features:
1. The launching of the Cold War in 
February 1946 by Winston Churchill, a t 
Fulton, U.S.A.
2. The publication of the Baruch Plan in 
June 1946.
3. The M arshall P lan, which was outlined at 
H arvard exactly a year later.
I do not wish to say anything about 
Fulton, except th a t it came less than  six 
months after VJ-day, and less than  four 
years after Churchill’s own government put 
its signature to the Twenty-year Anglo- 
Soviet Treaty of Alliance.
On 24 January , 1946, just a m onth before 
Fulton, the U.N. Assembly set up the Atomic 
Energy Commission. In March, just a month 
after Fulton, the State Departm ent released 
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, described by 
B la c k e tt  a s  a " b r i l l i a n t l y  w r i t te n
document...whose initial assum ptions, th a t 
there can be no monopoly by one nation of 
the atomic bomb...closely follow those of the 
Franck Report". 12
This new report proposed an Atomic 
Development Authority which would own 
and operate all key atomic plants, and 
envisioned a transitional period during 
which stockpiles of bombs and plants to 
produce fissile m aterial would "continue to
be located within the United S tates....Our
monopoly on knowledge cannot be, and 
should not be lost a t once". 13
Three m onths later, on 13 June a t the first 
meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
Bernard Baruch put forward, on behalf of 
the U.S. Government, proposals for the 
in ternational control of atomic energy. At 
the second meeting, six days later, Andrej 
Gromyko presented the Soviet proposals.
Blackett comments th a t "the American 
proposals amounted to the adoption of the 
A c h e so n -L ilie n th a l R ep o rt w ith  th e  
im portant addition th a t decisions relating to
atomic energy.... should not be subject to the
veto power". 14 Baruch himself, in his 
introductory statem ent, said, "The subject 
goes straigh t to the veto power contained in 
the C harter of the United Nations....The 
m atter of punishm ent lies at the very heart 
of our security system".
Of the proposed Atomic Development 
Authority, Baruch said that, "The personnel 
should be recruited on a basis of proven 
competence, but also, as far as possible, on 
an in ternational basis" (my emphasis). And 
he concluded: "But before a country is ready 
to relinquish any winning weapons it m ust 
have a guarantee of safety, not only against 
offenders in the atomic area, but aga inst the 
i l le g a l u se rs  of o th e r  w eap o n s  — 
bacteriological, biological, gas — perhaps — 
why not? — against war itse lf '.15
Nobody seems to have pointed out to 
Baruch th a t the Red Army was also, in its 
way, a winning weapon — like possession of 
the C arpathian  mountains, or a strategic 
area like Afghanistan. In short, the Baruch 
Plan was rejected by the Soviets.
Adam Ulam, in his biography of Stalin, 
suggests that, "Once the Soviet Union 
dem onstrated th a t it would not play ball (at 
least not according to the American rules) a t 
the U.N., a considerably body of opinion 
reverted to the theme th a t S talin aspired to 
world domination". He comments, "If the 
Americans had been less neurotic, Soviet-
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American relations could have been correct 
if distant". 16
The basis for the American neurosis was 
clearly indicated by Stimpson, in an  article 
in the Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists February 
1947. "The future may see a time when such a 
weapon m ay be constructed in secret and 
used suddenly against an  unsuspecting 
nation or group, of much greater size and 
m aterial power." This will readily be 
recognised as being very different from 
constructing it in secret and using it against 
an  unsuspecting nation of sm aller size and 
m aterial power, which is trying to find 
someone to whom to surrender.
Finally, the M arshall P lan — 1947. 
Prim arily, this was the translation of the 
thinking behind the Baruch plan into the 
economic arena. Ulam comments: "In the 
State Departm ent there was surprise, not 
unmixed with apprehension...when the 
Soviet G overnm ent accepted  the  ... 
invitation to meet and examine the U.S. 
initiative....How could one persuade Senator 
Taft th a t Communism could be fought by 
handing over money to Stalin." 17
Conclusion
P.M.S. Blackett wrote in 1948:
The Baruch Plan failed because, in its 
attem pt to secure nearly complete security 
for America, it was inevitably driven to 
propose a course o f action which would have 
put the Soviet Union in a situation whereby 
she would have been subservient to a group 
of nations dominated by America...The only 
way in which the American people can 
obtain complete safety from atomic bombs is 
by effective American control over all other 
nations. 18
I remember those days well. When the 
Atomic Energy Commission was set up I 
was still in the army. By the time the 
M arshall P lan was proposed I was studying 
a t the London School of Economics. Ever 
since VJ-day the talk had been about 
internationalism  — the United N ations — 
One World. T hat was the title of a book by a 
group of American scientists One World or 
None published in March 1946.
Unfortunately the Soviet and American 
peoples — yes, and the British and 
A ustralian peoples too — were "hot for 
certainties", to borrow a phrase from George 
Meredith. And they got w hat he would have 
called a very "dusty answer".
FOOTNOTES
1 P.M .S. B lack ett M ilita ry  and  po litica l 
consequences o f Atomic Energy, Turnstile Press, 
1948.1 have made liberal use of secondary sources, 
but of none more freely than  of this book by 
Blackett. F irst published in 1948, it is a better 
guide to the in ternational relationships of the 
1980s (if any) than  anything I have seen written in 
the last twelve months, and indeed beyond, for a 
good m any years.
2 John Silverlight, The Victor’s Dilemma Barrie 
and Jenkins, 1970, p.l.
I K.S. Pinson, Modern Germany Macmillan, 1966 
Ch. 14, pp. 384 and 389/70.
4 A.P. Adamthwaite, The M aking o f the Second 
World War, Allen and Unwin, 1977, p. 89.
3 A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, 
Pelican Books, 1970, p. 641.
* Ibid, p. 720
7 Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945, Pan 
Books, 1965, p 914.
8 Ibid, p. 914
a Ibid, p. 916. Em phasis by Werth.
10 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol 6 
1954, pp 552-4.
II Taylor, p. 728. The Churchill minute to Eden is 
referred to by Werth, p. 921.
12 Blackett, p. 108.
1:1 Ibid, pp. 108-114.
11 Ibid. p. 131
lr' Ibid, pp. 134-5.
16 Adam B. Ulam, Stalin, Allen Lane, 1974, pp 640-
1. This book was first “published in America in 
1973. The following year, Ulam was appointed 
Director of the Russian Research Centre, 
Harvard, where he had been professor of 
Government since 1950. The biography is 
fundam entally anti-Stalinist, but it has some 
interesting passages, such as those quoted.
17 Ibid, p. 658.
IH Blackett, pp 144-5. It is good to open and close 
with a quotation from this absolutely first class 
book.
